Off The Fence

Or: why Europe must give credit to its defence.

The bad news upfront. Our opus about MA balance sheets will have to wait. In our September VCO we promised the piece about credit and UK life balance sheets for October, but it has unfortunately slipped to December. In our defence, we are focusing this issue on more pressing matters.

Europe has awoken from its deep slumber and decided it is finally time to rearm. At The Hague in June last year, every NATO member committed to spend 5% of GDP on defence by 2035, 3.5% on core defence and up to 1.5% on the infrastructure and industry behind it.[1] In 2014, three allies met the old 2% target; by 2024, twenty-three did.[2] The UK reaches 2.5% in 2027 and has set its sights on 3% by 2030.[3] Germany amended its constitution to exempt defence spending above 1% of GDP from the debt brake.[4] Brussels assembled an envelope of roughly €800bn and named it ReArm Europe.[5] Last month we wrote about a €10 trillion pool of capital looking for assets. This month we write about defence and the unprecedented need for creative capital solutions to deliver a safe and strong Europe.

Governments have come off the fence. The question for credit is who follows them, how carefully and on what terms. We have been deeply engaged in this topic over the course of this year and while the significant majority of the capital has flocked to private equity or venture capital (the next Palantir or Anduril), credit is still underserved. That also makes sense. While equity and venture are about “hitting the jackpot”, credit is about not losing money. The answer, as always, is in the detail, and this issue talks about the abundant but nuanced opportunity for defence credit in the Lower Mid-Market (“LMM”).

As a credit specialist in the LMM across cash flow and asset-backed finance (“ABF”), we accidentally find ourselves uniquely positioned for this opportunity set. Vertis and DunPort lend across the European lower mid-market, cash flow and asset-backed, and have done for years; defence is a sector within that platform, not the platform. Within it, Foundry Capital is our specialist for the smaller, more granular end, providing growth, ABL and contract financing to defence SMEs, while the larger cash flow and ABF financings for the wider European aerospace and defence market run through Vertis and DunPort directly. Our strategy in Europe is not reinventing the wheel: implementing our existing toolkit to support defence suppliers in the LMM across those western and northern European geographies which are integral to Europe’s rearmament.

A note on intent: We write the Credit Observer to sharpen our own thinking and to hold ourselves accountable to the standards we set. This essay is the groundwork for that conviction, argued in public where it can be tested. We lay out some of our learnings here but if you would like to share your views or are interested in learning more, please don’t hesitate to reach out to the team. We welcome feedback and debate.


Deficit Spending

Europe ran a thirty-year deficit in its own defence. It is now repaying it with deficit spending. The arithmetic of the deficit is brutal: European NATO members spent 3.0% of GDP on defence in 1990 and 1.47% at the trough in 2014.[6] The difference was spent, twice over, on everything else. Britain supplies the industrial version of the same statistic: a country that once ran forty-four Royal Ordnance Factories now fills its artillery shells at a single site.[7] The direction of travel has changed dramatically. Since 2022 we have seen the fastest sustained increase in European defence budgets since the Cold War. This is a structural increase and like the proverbial supertanker, we don’t expect it to change quickly. After building up a defence spending deficit, Europe is now deficit spending its way out of it.