Default Setting

Or: can you have too few of a good thing?

In our first issue we described a Dodgeball Market: one where the surprises hide in plain sight, come at you from every direction, and are usually not good. The question we asked was what an investor should do in such a market. Our answer was to stand where the surprises are assumed in advance: the Lower Mid-Market, where old school lending standards still hold, the documents are written to assume bumps in the road, leverage leaves room for it, and a lender is paid to expect it. We launched a white paper together with DunPort in 2025 making that case, and we promised to keep score. This issue does just that.

Private credit default rates made the financial pages, the word contagion has made a comeback, and surveys of the smaller end of the market produced the scariest numbers of all. In the second quarter, defaults among borrowers below $100m of EBITDA reached 3.6% by count, and 12% of loans to companies with $10m to $20m of EBITDA were marked below 90 cents.[1] It is time for us to take a closer look.

A note on intent: We write the Credit Observer to sharpen our own thinking and to hold ourselves accountable to the standards we set. This essay is the groundwork for that conviction, argued in public where it can be tested. We lay out some of our learnings here but if you would like to share your views or are interested in learning more, please don’t hesitate to reach out to the team. We welcome feedback and debate.


Keeping Score

Kroll and StepStone benchmark more than 17,000 private credit loans globally; KBRA’s European dataset covers €226bn of originations.[2] Both find the same shape. Smaller borrowers pay more and are less levered: 537 basis points of spread at 3.9x leverage in the Lower Mid-Market, against 488 basis points at 5.1x in the upper mid-market. In Europe the gap is wider still: 585 basis points at 3.7x below €20m of EBITDA, against 516 at 4.8x above it. Per turn of leverage, the small end earns over 40% more than the large end.[3]